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THE CONTEMPORARY  PHILLIPS  CURVE  measuring  the tradeoff  between  in- 
flation and unemployment in the United States is so unfavorable that many 
economists and most policy makers have reached the conclusion that no 
combination of inflation and unemployment permitted by the curve is ac- 
ceptable. The recent policy of the United States has responded to this prob- 
lem mainly through the imposition of controls on prices and wages. Few 
economists regard these controls as a satisfactory solution in the long run 
to the problem of achieving low rates of unemployment at tolerable levels 
of inflation. There is substantial agreement  in the profession that the funda- 
mental cause of the unfavorable Phillips curve is in the failure of labor mar- 
kets to operate properly. My purpose in this paper is to examine critically 
the prospects for a long-run attack on inflation and unemployment through 
treatment of the fundamental causes of the problem. Policies with this goal 
that operate directly in the labor market are known collectively as man- 
power policy. 
Economists are far from agreement about the precise reasons for the 
failure of labor markets to perform adequately. In my earlier paper, "Why 
Is the Unemployment Rate So High at Full Employment?"' I reviewed 
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alternative explanations of the unfavorable position of the Phillips curve, 
looking at the problem as one of explaining the high level of unemployment 
that remains even when there is sufficient aggregate demand to raise prices 
at the rate of 3 or 4 percent per year. Any discussion about unemployment 
must carry a reminder of the way data on unemployment are gathered. The 
official statistics record as unemployed those who are looking for work, not 
necessarily those who are out of work. Consequently, it can be a serious 
mistake to think of unemployment as the difference between supply and 
demand in a particular labor market. I will return to this point. 
One of  the  oldest theories relating to  the Phillips curve involves the 
notion of sectoral disequilibrium. Of the many regional and occupational 
labor markets in the economy, some will have excess supply at any point 
in time because of continual changes in the pattern of supply and demand 
in the markets. Workers are inhibited from moving from one market to 
another by the cost of moving and by lack of information about jobs in 
other sectors. Even so, the theory requires that equilibration take place as 
time passes; it  explains the  chronic existence of  unemployment by hy- 
pothesizing continuing random shocks in labor markets. My examination 
of the empirical evidence showed that there are important differences in 
unemployment rates by geographic location, but that these differences are 
stable over time, even during a period of large increases in aggregate de- 
mand and substantial changes in the composition of demand. In my earlier 
paper I went on to discuss an alternative explanation of the geographical 
pattern of unemployment. In any event, no convincing empirical case can 
be made that  transitory disequilibrium accounts for a very large fraction 
of the unemployment that is observed at full employment. 
A second explanation of the Phillips curve emphasizes the role of turn- 
over in the labor force in maintaining the pool of unemployed workers. It 
also emphasizes that the rational worker will devote a reasonable period of 
time to the process of searching for a new job. One might characterize  this 
as a rigorous theoretical development of the traditional notion of frictional 
unemployment. Given the high levels of turnover in the economy, the mod- 
ern search-turnover  theory seems to be supported by the data: High rates 
of unemployment are not caused by the permanent inability of a fraction 
of the labor force to find jobs. Rather, high rates are associated with the 
existence of frequent spells of unemployment. Again, I will return to this 
point. The major limitation of the search-turnover  theory is its failure to 
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economy. In this sense it cannot claim to provide a complete account of 
the problems of labor markets, but it does clarify the nature of the prob- 
lems. In particular, it makes clear that the traditional theory of structural 
unemployment needs reformulation: The problem of disadvantaged work- 
ers, relative to other members of the labor force, is that they are unable to 
find stable jobs, not that they are unable to find work at all. 
Two  bodies  of  thought  seek to  explain the  observation that  certain 
groups in the labor force have pathologically high rates of unemployment. 
The first emphasizes considerations on the supply side of the market. Ac- 
cording to this view, disadvantaged workers have trouble finding and hold- 
ing jobs because they lack the background and skills for the jobs available. 
The second emphasizes characteristics of the demand for labor. It holds 
that the economy tends to offer too many bad jobs and too few good jobs 
with high wages and good working conditions, and to systematically ex- 
clude disadvantaged workers from good jobs. Neither of these views speci- 
fies the link between lack of skills or lack of good jobs, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, turnover, which I have already indicated is the main 
source of  high unemployment. Why do  disadvantaged workers lose  or 
leave their jobs so soon after taking them, granted that they are relatively 
poor jobs? This remains a central unanswered question in the theory of 
unemployment. 
I distinguish three kinds of manpower policies relating to the diagnoses 
just discussed. The first attempts to make the labor market function more 
effectively with the existing patterns of supply and demand. Programs of 
this kind involve placement activities and counseling of workers looking 
for jobs  and of employers looking  for workers. They may also involve 
schemes for increasing the mobility of workers. A comprehensive program 
of this sort has just  been proposed by Charles Holt,  Duncan  MacRae, 
Stuart Schweitzer, and Ralph Smith at the Urban Institute. The first major 
section of my paper is devoted to a critical review of their program and the 
theory that underlies it. 
The second kind of manpower program attempts to change the pattern 
of the supply of labor. Federal policy of the past decade has generally  taken 
this form, emphasizing the training and upgrading of disadvantaged work- 
ers. Discussion  of this kind of policy occupies the second section of the 
paper. 
The third kind of policy tries to influence the composition of the demand 
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Federal manpower programs seem to have shifted in this direction, but I 
will argue that most of the shift is illusory. A  close examination of the 
largest new program uncovers few differences  from the traditional training 
programs that it was intended to replace. I go on to discuss small programs 
that seem to have been successful in putting disadvantaged  workers in good 
jobs, but I am pessimistic about the prospects for a large-scale federal pro- 
gram of this kind. 
Throughout the paper, I attempt to maintain a consistent approach to 
the measurement of the effect of manpower policies on the position of the 
Phillips curve. The problem is to  distinguish between movements along 
the curve, which will be induced by any increase in the demand for labor, 
and true shifts of the curve. Only the latter permit lower rates of unemploy- 
ment at a given rate of inflation. I make an effort to present estimates of the 
impacts of alternative policies that are standardized for the inflationary ef- 
fects of the policies. I do this by choosing a reference level of unemploy- 
ment, 4.5 percent, and asking what new level of unemployment after the 
implementation of  a particular policy causes the same level of inflation 
that would exist at the reference level of unemployment in the absence of 
the policy. 
The Manpower  Policy Recommended  by Holt and His Colleagues 
Any discussion of the aggregate impact of manpower policy must neces- 
sarily pay close attention to the recent papers of Charles C. Holt and his 
colleagues at the Urban Institute, including the report that follows in this 
issue  of Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity.2  Among  economists  inter- 
ested in policies for shifting the Phillips curve, only Holt and his group at 
the Urban Institute have formulated a consistent theoretical view of the de- 
tailed operation of labor markets, applied that theory to make recommen- 
dations for manpower policy, and attempted to estimate the aggregate  costs 
and effects of the policies. 
The theory underlying  the work of Holt and his group can be summarized 
briefly as follows: There are many labor markets in the economy, distin- 
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guished by location,  occupation, and characteristics of workers. In each 
market, workers continually flow into unemployment because of quits or 
layoffs or because of the entrance of new workers. Unemployed workers 
must spend time searching  for jobs, gathering information about openings, 
wages, and working conditions, or waiting for jobs to become available. 
Even when the market is in stochastic equilibrium, in the sense that there 
is no  unexpected upward or downward pressure on the wage level, the 
natural turnover in the labor force will cause a positive unemployment rate. 
When unemployment falls below this level and employers find it harder to 
fill vacancies, the wage rises. Conversely, when unemployment rises above 
the equilibrium level, wages fall. However, the process is asymmetric: The 
inflation caused by 1 percentage point of unemployment below the equilib- 
rium level is greater in degree than the deflation caused by 1 percentage 
point of unemployment above the equilibrium level. In the aggregate, the 
rate of change of the wage level averaged  over all markets depends not only 
on the average  unemployment rate but also on the dispersion of rates among 
the markets. For the same average level of unemployment, more inflation 
develops if there is substantial variance in the unemployment rates of the 
various markets than if they all had the same rate. 
In "Manpower Programs," Holt and his colleagues propose four kinds 
of policies: 
1. Those that improve both the speed of matching workers and  jobs and 
the quality of the matches. For a given flow of workers into unemployment, 
these policies will decrease the unemployment rate by shortening unem- 
ployment for each individual. Further, better matches should last longer 
and therefore reduce the flow into unemployment. 
2.  Those that reduce turnover in groups where it is particularly high, 
especially teenagers. 
3.  Those that increase the supply of workers in markets where labor 
shortages exist, either by shifting them from other markets or by bringing 
them into the labor force. This reduces the dispersion of unemployment 
and  allows  a  lower  average unemployment rate for  any  given rate of 
inflation. 
4.  Those that break down institutional barriers  between labor markets- 
union restrictions on entry, restrictive occupational licensing, and so forth. 
These barriers  increase unemployment by increasing the dispersion of un- 
employment among occupations and reducing the efficiency of search. 
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make is that the existing manpower programs of the federal government 
are basically on the right track, but that they should be expanded several- 
fold and devoted less exclusively to serving disadvantaged workers. Holt's 
group emphasizes the principle that improvements in the efficiency of labor 
markets, especially those that relieve shortages, yield an indir  ect benefit for 
disadvantaged  workers by permitting an overall tightening of labor markets 
through monetary and fiscal policy without inflation. Although this prin- 
ciple is recognized in discussions of the macroeconomic theory of inflation, 
it is often overlooked in evaluating the effects of manpower programs. 
IMPROVING  THE SPEED AND  QUALITY  OF MATCHING 
The first part of the program proposed by Holt  and his associates in- 
volves a very substantial increase in the most traditional and uncontrover- 
sial activity of the federal government in labor markets, the Employment 
Service. 
They propose a tripling in the number of counselors and interviewers  in 
the Employment Service and their upgrading through a 25 percent salary 
increase. These proposals would raise the cost of the service from its present 
level of about $600 million to  $2.4 billion. The overall effects of this in- 
crease, according to their estimates, would be a decrease of 5 percent in the 
average time an unemployed worker requires to find a job and another 5 
percent decrease in the flow of workers into unemployment through quits 
and layoffs. Centralization of  information about job  openings through 
computerized matching and the increase in the staff of the Employment 
Service would speed up the process of finding jobs, and improved counsel- 
ing of workers and employers would reduce the frequency of quits and lay- 
offs at a given level of aggregate demand. 
It is hard to quarrel with a figure as low as 5 percent of anything, but the 
two figures  taken together imply a not insubstantial reduction of 0.5 point- 
to 4.0 percent in their example-in  the overall unemployment rate. In the 
present case I am seriously concerned that their estimates of the effects of 
their programs on the unemployment rate err on the optimistic side. Even 
within the general view of the operation of labor markets held by the au- 
thors (I will discuss my objection to this view presently), there is no theo- 
retical presumption that the policies recommended will reduce rather than 
increase the unemployment rate. Their goals of speeding up placements and 
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it is to find a new job the more likely is a worker to quit, and the easier it is 
to fill a position subsequently  the more likely is an employer to lay a worker 
off. The authors admit this candidly, but nonetheless they project a decrease 
in quits and layoffs as a result of their policy. 
Students of the labor market agree  that if workers  could be better matched 
to jobs, the unemployment rate would be lower. At unemployment rates 
under 5 percent, a good portion of those unemployed are apparently mov- 
ing from one job they don't like to another, or are looking for the least 
unsatisfactory  job available after having been out of the labor force.3 The 
question at hand is whether very much can be done to improve the quality of 
matching jobs and workers through expansion and reorganization of the 
Employment Service. Since improved matching not  only is supposed to 
bring about a 5 percent reduction in turnover but also must counteract the 
tendency of faster placement to stimulate turnover, Holt's program puts a 
great deal of faith in the ability of counselors and computers to improve 
and speed the allocation of workers to jobs. Quite apart from the obstacles 
to reorganizing and redirecting as firmly entrenched a bureaucracy as the 
Employment Service,4 there are serious doubts about the usefulness of a 
substantial expansion of centralized placement services. The benefits of 
better matching are chiefly private and accrue to the individual worker in 
the form of high wages, a more satisfying  job, and less unemployment, and 
to the employer in the form of reduced costs of turnover.5  If large as yet un- 
realized returns could be made by listing jobs  and counseling workers, 
profits would be available to private entrepreneurs  in the placement busi- 
ness. The fact that the existing placement industry is so small and serves 
3. See Hall, "Why Is the Unemployment  Rate So High?"  pp. 388-96. 
4. A complete and pessimistic  account is available in Stanley H. Ruttenberg  and 
Jocelyn  Gutchess,  The Federal-State  Einploynzent Service (Johns Hopkins  Press,  1970). 
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only a few specialized markets suggests to an economist that in most mar- 
kets little is to be gained from formal placement agencies. What is known 
about the behavior of individual workers confirms this suspicion: By and 
large, workers find jobs  by consulting their friends and inquiring at fac- 
tories and businesses, and have relatively little use for the Employment 
Service.6  Holt and his associates interpret  this as evidence that the Employ- 
ment Service should be reformed, while I am suggesting that perhaps the 
whole idea of a central placement service is not a very useful one except in 
certain kinds of markets. 
Why might this be so? In the first place, labor markets are often rather 
different from the model that the proponents of an expanded Employment 
Service have in mind. Only a fraction of the new jobs that become available 
in a given month are thrown open to the public in the way suggested by the 
advocates of increased placement efforts. Most employers fill jobs without 
recourse to the open market for one of three reasons: (1) they do not want 
to, (2) they are not allowed to, or (3) they do not need to. 
Employers choose not to recruit from the open market because they al- 
ready have much better information about a group of workers-their  own 
employees-who,  furthermore, have accumulated training and experience 
specific to the firm's activities. The internal labor market, where jobs are 
filled solely by promotion, is a pervasive characteristic of a good fraction of 
the economy, and represents a rational and efficient response to the tech- 
nology  of production.7 Firms are prevented from recruiting in the open 
market by a wide variety of institutional and governmental restrictions. 
Perhaps the most important of these are union limitations on entry and 
government licensing. Finally, firms find it unnecessary  to recruit in the 
open market when the jobs they offer pay more than is necessary to attract 
enough workers without active recruitment. If the personnel office already 
possesses a long waiting list, as is true in many industries except in periods 
of extremely tight labor markets, it is literally not worth the trouble of in- 
forming the Employment Service when a job opens up. A firm pays more 
than it must only under duress; without constraints on its wage policy, it 
would reduce wages until the waiting list shrank close to zero and would 
6. See Harold L. Sheppard  and A. Harvey Belitsky, Thle  Job Hunt (Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1966),  and Peter  Doeringer  (ed.), "Low Income  Labor  Markets  and Urban Man- 
power Programs:  A Critical  Assessment,"  Joint Harvard-MIT  report submitted  to the 
Manpower Administration  (reproduced  by National Technical Information Service, 
1969). 
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Labor  Markets. Robert  E. Hall  667 
take advantage of the then useful (and free) Employment Service. Labor 
unions and other powerful institutions have as one of their main purposes 
forcing firms and other employers to pay more than is necessary to attract 
labor. There is little the Employment Service  can do to help these employers 
or to place unemployed workers in jobs with them. 
Together, the three reasons for the failure to recruit from the open mar- 
ket cut off a large portion of the jobs in the economy from assistance by the 
Employment Service. Starting from data on internal and external labor 
markets presented by Doeringer and Piore, I have attempted to estimate in 
a very rough way the portion of total employment in markets to which the 
Employment Service  might make a contribution. The classification appears 
in Table 1. Almost two-thirds of all employment is in markets where the 
Employment Service has little potential. Of these markets, those for mili- 
tary services, workers in craft unions, proprietors and self-employed family 
workers, and professionals presumably are noncontroversial. Public enter- 
prises are included because of the strength of worker associations, especially 
among postal workers, industrial unions for the reason indicated above, 
and large enterprises  because of the strength of internal labor markets. The 
Table 1.  Employment  Markets, by Usefulness of U.S. Employment 
Service, 1965 
Likelihlood of usefulness of Employment Service  Percent of 
and type of market  total emnployment 
Employment Service likely to be useful  34.7 
Institutions  (hospitals,  universities,  museums,  etc.)  2.9 
Small enterprises  27.0 
Farm laborers  1.5 
Domestic workers  2.4 
Odd job, service,  and repair  work  0.9 
Employment Service untlikely  to be useful  65.1 
Military  services  3.2 
Public enterprises  11.8 
Union workers  in large enterprises  11.8 
Nonunion workers  under  industrial  agreements  1.3 
Workers  outside the bargaining  unit in large enterprises  7.0 
Large  nonunion  enterprises  7.0 
Workers  in craft unions  9.4 
Proprietors  and self-employed  family workers  12.0 
Self-employed  professionals  1.6 
Source: Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore, Intertnal  Labor Markets and Manpower  Anialysis  (Heath, 
1971), Table 1, p. 42. Classification on the basis of the usefulness of the Employment Service was made by 
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last is subject to qualification since not every employee of a large enterprise 
is on a promotion ladder, and some large enterprises  fill entry-level  jobs by 
active recruitment  in the open market. However, large companies are often 
sufficiently well known that job hunters check directly with them, so that 
listing with the Employment Service would improve dissemination of in- 
formation about their openings only very slightly. 
It is small enterprises  and their prospective employees that are the natural 
clients of the Employment Service. Since the service is already of consider- 
able help to this market, a dramatic increase in its scale of operation would 
tend more to intensify its assistance in placing workers with small busi- 
nesses and individuals than to  extend its coverage of markets. Another 
trait of the Employment Service is apparent from Table 1. It cannot gen- 
erally place workers in the good jobs in the economy. Pleasant working 
conditions, high wages, and chances for promotion are much more com- 
mon in the second category than in the first. Even with a large expansion of 
the Employment Service,  better matching of workers and  jobs clearly means 
finding for each worker the least unsatisfactory of the poor jobs listed by 
the service. If, in reaction, the small faith workers have in the ability of the 
service to find them jobs fails to grow, the prospect for reducing unemploy- 
ment by expanding the service is rather  poorer than Holt and his colleagues 
have suggested. 
Since Holt, MacRae, Schweitzer, and Smith have attempted to estimate 
the effect of their policies, I will do the same, but with their misgivings re- 
doubled. For their proposed expansion of the Employment Service, my 
guess is that faster placement of  unemployed workers in jobs  in  small 
enterprises would reduce the aggregate unemployment rate by 0.1 point. 
Further, I suspect that faster placement would stimulate turnover by about 
the same amount that improved matching would reduce it, so that the total 
effect of the program on unemployment would be 0.1 point. 
PLACING  TEENAGERS 
The second part of the program of Holt's group is a direct attack on un- 
employment in the demographic group with much the highest unemploy- 
ment rate, teenagers. The diagnosis underlying the program is, I think, the 
correct one: The problem of high unemployment among teenagers (at full 
employment) is not that they have trouble finding jobs but that they have 
trouble keeping them. The duration of their unemployment is low, but its Robert E. Hall  669 
frequency is high. Holt believes that a major cause of this problem is that 
teenagers receive little preparation  in school for work, and almost no infor- 
mation about the sorts of jobs available when they leave school. As a re- 
sult, they move rapidly from one job to another, finding out in a rather ex- 
pensive way what kind of work they like. 
Holt and his colleagues propose that the educational system be modified 
to permit students in the ninth through twelfth grades to participate in fed- 
erally supported work-study programs. They propose a federal expenditure 
of $1,000 per student to provide after-school and summer  employment for a 
million high school students, and a large increase in vocational counseling 
for teenagers. They estimate that these policies would reduce unemploy- 
ment among teenage students while they are attending school from 600,000 
to  100,000, and would reduce turnover among teenagers who are not in 
school by about 17 percent. These figures represent reductions of 500,000 
and 100,000 in the number of unemployed teenagers, and together would 
decrease the aggregate unemployment rate by 0.7 point. 
The first of these estimates, however, appears to be inconsistent with one 
of the important conclusions of Holt's theory. Unemployment of teenagers 
is not simply the difference between the supply of labor they offer and the 
demand for it. If the program generated a net increase of 750,000 or even a 
million jobs for teenagers, unemployment would not shrink to zero. There 
are over 11 million youths aged 16, 17, and 18 at the moment. If a million of 
them were in a work-study program, there would surely be a level of turn- 
over among the remaining 10 million not too different from what it is now. 
For example, teenagers intending to go to college would probably not be 
interested in the work-study program, yet they might very well look for a 
job after school and thus appear in the statistics as unemployed. At the very 
outside, unemployment of teenagers in school might be reduced by 100,000 
by the work-study program. There are 15 million teenagers in grades 9-12, 
of whom 600,000, on the average, are looking for work when the overall 
unemployment rate is 4.5 percent. If the work-study program took teen- 
agers at random,  and if  the  rate of  turnover and  average duration of 
unemployment of those not enrolled remained the same, then unemploy- 
ment would fall by 6.7 percent (1 million out of 15 million) of 600,000, or 
40,000. If the program were successful in recruiting unemployment-prone 
teenagers, or if it tightened the market for teenagers and thus reduced the 
duration of unemployment, its effect might be somewhat larger. In the long 
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easier to find, on the one hand, additional teenagers are likely to enter the 
labor force, and as teenage workers become harder to find, on the other 
hand, employers will begin recruiting in other markets. 
The estimate of the reduction in unemployment of teenagers out of school 
suffers from many of the defects that compromise the estimate for the gen- 
eral expansion of the Employment Service. What is the prospect for such a 
large reduction in unemployment of teenagers through vocational counsel- 
ing when the counselor can only identify the least unsatisfactory of a set of 
unattractive  jobs? The element that seems to be missing is any discussion of 
the need to open up good jobs, especially for disadvantaged teenagers. In 
any case, the Urban Institute estimate of the impact of this program suffers 
from the technical defect that it is not standardized for its inflationary ef- 
fect. Part of the reduction in unemployment they ascribe to the program is 
simply movement along the Phillips curve, not a shift in it. A more reason- 
able estimate of the effect of the proposed policies for teenagers on the 
overall unemployment rate might be 0.2 point after allowance for its infla- 
tionary effect. In spite of this, I think the proposal to emphasize work-study 
programs has much merit as an alternative to the existing system of class- 
room and vocational instruction in high schools. 
REDISTRIBUTING  THE LABOR FORCE 
The third component of the proposal of Holt, MacRae, Schweitzer, and 
Smith is a set of programs for reducing the dispersion of unemployment 
rates among the many labor markets in the economy. They focus separately 
on two dimensions distinguishing the markets, occupation and geograph- 
ical location. Three basic policies are suggested for reducing the occupa- 
tional dispersion of unemployment: retraining  current  members of the labor 
force to qualify for jobs in markets where unemployment is lower than the 
average, restructuring  jobs, and inducing the entry of women with children 
into labor markets where shortages exist. The first involves the creation of 
1.1 million new training slots-half  allotted to women-to  teach workers to 
fill jobs in markets with shortages (70,000 such slots exist in the present 
training establishment). On the employers' side, they propose the addition 
of 4,000 industrial engineers and psychologists to the staff of the Employ- 
ment Service to  advise on methods for substituting workers in plentiful 
supply for those in short supply. Finally, they propose an annual subsidy of 
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into  the labor force of  1.37 million women with 2.75 million children. 
Child care would be available only to women qualified to be trained for 
jobs in tight markets; this qualification would be implemented by locating 
the child care center at the place of employment or by linking the subsidy to 
a woman's occupation. 
Holt and his colleagues do not give a direct estimate of the effect on un- 
employment of their program for alleviating shortages by occupation. In- 
stead, they make the remarkable, and to me untenable, assumption that 
their programs would totally eliminate dispersion in unemployment rates. 
To translate this into unemployment terms, they fit a simple Phillips curve 
in which the dispersion of unemployment as well as its average level ap- 
pears, and calculate the amount by which the average level of unemploy- 
ment could be reduced, assuming that inflation were constant, if dispersion 
were eliminated. The results of this calculation are impressive: Elimination 
of dispersion by occupation could reduce the average level of unemploy- 
ment by 1.1 points, about a quarter of the 4.5 percent reference level for 
their calculations. I find this procedure defective in two respects. First, the 
analysis requires the crucial assumption that the intercept of the aggregate 
Phillips curve is unaffected  by the redistribution of the labor force that they 
propose.  That intercept is  a  weighted average of  the  intercepts of  the 
Phillips curves for the various occupational markets, where the weights are 
the shares of total employment in each occupation. The weighted average 
will remain unchanged after the redistribution of the labor force if the dis- 
tribution of employment remains unchanged or if all of the individual inter- 
cepts are the  same. The former contradicts the  search-turnover theory, 
which predicts that the effect of moving a group of workers who happen to 
be unemployed at a moment in time is no different, after a few months, 
from the effect of moving workers who happened to be employed then. The 
theory predicts that the effect of removing workers from a market is to re- 
duce both unemployment and employment in the market. The latter  justifi- 
cation for an unchanged intercept is clearly not  supported by the data. 
Some occupations involve inherently higher unemployment than others, so 
their intercepts are higher. I conclude that the assumption of an unchanged 
intercept of the aggregate Phillips curve is untenable, and that the large 
estimate of the effect of redistributing  the labor force among occupations is 
open to serious question on this account. 
Second, even if the calculation of the effects of the program were tech- 
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group, the program itself does not make good sense. It proposes to shift the 
aggregate Phillips curve to the left by causing the rates of wage inflation to 
vary substantially  over occupational groups. Occupations where the Phillips 
curves have large intercepts would have high rates of inflation, while those 
with small intercepts would be required to have low rates of inflation, or 
perhaps even  falling wages.  For  example, their recommendation taken 
literally implies that the  rate of  increase of  the  wages  of  construction 
workers should be higher than it is now (though it is high already) and that 
the rate of wage increase for professional and technical workers should be 
lower than it is now (though it is low already). In order to maintain the 
more favorable aggregate Phillips curve achieved this way, it would be 
necessary to maintain the differentials  in the rates of wage increase perma- 
nently, thus creating growing disparities in the levels of wages. This strikes 
me as neither practical nor desirable. 
I think that the emphasis of the Urban Institute group on elimination of 
occupational differentials  in unemployment is quite mistaken, and that they 
should return to the more limited and traditional goal of identifying and 
eliminating specific bottlenecks in the labor market. I estimate that a real- 
istic program of this kind could reduce the overall unemployment rate by 
about 0.1 point after standardization for inflation. 
Holt and his colleagues also propose a program for reducing the geo- 
graphic dispersion in  unemployment by  subsidizing the  movement  of 
workers from slack to tight markets. Their analysis is essentially parallel to 
that for occupational dispersion, and suffers from the same overstatement 
of the potential effects of the policy. In addition, there is a certain amount 
of double-counting in their evaluation of the two programs: To the extent 
that the dispersion of unemployment among states is caused by the dis- 
persion of employment by occupation among the states, the first program 
would reduce the dispersion among states as well, leaving less for the second 
program. I am inclined to reduce their estimate of the effect of the program 
from 0.3 point to zero. 
LOWERING  INSTITUTIONAL  BARRIERS 
The last set of programs suggested by Holt,  MacRae, Schweitzer, and 
Smith deals with what strikes me as the heart of the problem-institutional 
barriers  in the labor market. A certain ambiguity surrounds  their discussion 
of this topic because it does not fit easily into their theoretical framework. Robert E. Hall  673 
Within  that  framework,  barriers to  mobility  between  markets  have  an ad- 
verse effect  on the Phillips  curve  by increasing  the dispersion  of unemploy- 
ment  and decreasing  the efficiency  of search-that  is, union  restrictions  on 
entry  are bad  because  a transitory  tightening  of  the  market  cannot  be  al- 
leviated  by the free movement  of workers  from  other markets.  Holt  and his 
colleagues  do not hold  to this excessively  narrow  view  of the effects  of these 
institutions.  They recognize  that the institutions  operate  to create  a chronic 
excess  supply  in their  markets,  effectively  cutting  off entry  to  a good  por- 
tion  of  the  total  number  of jobs  in  the  economy.  They  do  not  make  any 
concrete  suggestions  for breaking  down  institutional  barriers, nor add any- 
thing to their list of estimated  reductions  in unemployment  on this account. 
Table 2 presents  a revised  version  of the effects Holt  and his group  expect 
their  policies  to  have  in  an  economy  with  the  same  level  of  inflation  that 
would  correspond  with 4.5 percent  unemployment  in  1972. 
I  conclude  that  relatively  little  improvement  in  unemployment  can  be 
expected  from  the very large expansion  of traditional  manpower  programs 
advocated  by Holt  and his colleagues. 
Table  2.  Alternative  Estimates  of  Potential  Reduction  in  Unemployment 
through Selected  Manpower  Program  Proposals 
Estimnates  by Holt and 
associates  Present  estimates 
ReductionI  in  Redulction  in 
unemploymenzt  unzemnployment 
rate at 4.5  rate at 4.5 
percent  base  percenzt  base 
Reduiction  in  (percentage  Reduictioni  in  (percentage 
Program  unemployment  points)  unemploymenit  points) 
Expansion  of 
Employment  Service  10%  0.5  2%  0.1 
Vocational  counseling 
and teenage  work- 
study  15  0.7  4  0.2 
Occupational  mobility  25  1.1  2  0.1 
Geographic  mobility  7  0.3  0  0.0 
Total, all programs  47a  2. 1  8a  0.4 
Sources: Estimates by Holt and associates,  this volume,  their Table  1,  p.  717; Hall  estimates-see 
text for underlying factors. 
a.  Computed by  multiplying components;  for  example, 0.47 =  1 -  (1 -  0.10) X (1  -  0.15) X (1 - 
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Reducing  Unemployment  among Disadvantaged  Workers 
The Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 (ARA) marked  the start of modern 
federal policies for dealing selectively with groups in the labor force that 
suffer  from rates of unemployment  higher than the average  rate. It provided 
for training programs for unemployed workers in regions with high unem- 
ployment. Soon after the ARA was enacted, the Manpower Development 
and Training Act  of  1962 (MDTA)  provided two  distinct training pro- 
grams, which are still in operation today: institutional training and on-the- 
job training (OJT). The latter is now part of the program called Job Op- 
portunities in  the  Business Sector (JOBS). Modern training programs 
have come to  focus more on disadvantaged workers-blacks,  teenagers, 
and the poorly educated-than  on regional unemployment. Less traditional 
approaches to helping disadvantaged workers were embodied in two well- 
known programs associated with the war on poverty: the Neighborhood 
Youth Corps (NYC) and the Job Corps. Both of these programs provide 
employment for trainees during their periods of enrollment and give assis- 
tance in locating jobs after completion of training.8 A variety of programs 
has been instituted more recently with similar objectives; these include the 
Concentrated  Employment Program (CEP), offering a broad range of ser- 
vices to disadvantaged  workers; JOBS, offering  training and jobs in private 
industry (discussed in a later section); and the Work Incentive Program 
(WIN), offering  training to adults who receive public assistance. 
The magnitudes of these programs are indicated in Table 3, using two 
different measures: the number of individuals enrolled at the end of the 
month, averaged over January, April, July, and December 1970, and the 
number of individuals  who enrolled for the first  time between July 1969 and 
June 1970. In most of the programs, the average enrollment is well below 
the annual flow of new enrollments, indicating a salient feature of these 
programs: On the average, they retain their trainees for only a few months. 
It is possible to make a rough calculation of the average duration of a 
trainee's stay simply by dividing the average enrollment by the flow of new 
enrollments and multiplying by 12 to convert to months. This measure is 
accurate for programs that are neither growing nor shrinking, and over- 
states the average duration for programs that are growing. The results of 
8. For a complete history and evaluation of these programs  and the MDTA, see 
Sar A.  Levitan  and  Garth  L.  Mangum,  Federal Training and  Work Programs  in the 
Sixties (Ann Arbor: Institute  of Labor and Industrial  Relations, 1969). Robert E. Hall  675 
Table 3.  Number  and Average Duration of Enrollments  for Manpower 
Training  Programs Administered  by the Department  of Labor, 1970 
Number 
Average  of new 
iiunuber  entrants 
enirolled,  Juily 1969-  Average 
1970a  June 1970  duration 
Program  (thousanids)  (thousands)  (months) 
Manpower  Development  and Training  Act 
Institutional  training  51  130  4.7 
On-the-job  training  43  91  5.7 
Neighborhood  Youth Corps 
In school and summer  179  436  4.9 
Out of school  32  46  8.3 
Operation  Mainstream  14  13  12.9 
Public Service Careers  6  4  18.0 
Concentrated  Employment  Program  47  110  5.1 
Job Opportunities  in the Business  Sectorb  40  87  5.5 
Work Incentive  Program  89  93  11.5 
Job Corps  20  43  5.6 
All programs  522  1,051  6.0 
Source:  Manpower  Report  of  the President,  April  1971,  Table  2,  p.  38,  and  Table  F-1,  p.  299.  Average 
duration is ratio of first to second column multiplied by 12. Figures are rounded and may not add to totals. 
a.  Average of the numbers enrolled in January, April, July, and December 1970. 
b.  Federally financed. 
this calculation are shown in the third column of Table 3. Except for three 
fast-growing  programs  (Operation Mainstream,  Public Service  Careers,  and 
WIN) and the out-of-school program of the NYC, the estimated durations 
all lie between four and six months. Any discussion of the long-run effects 
of these programs must take account of this fact. 
Partly because of their short duration, training programs for disadvan- 
taged workers seem almost insignificant  when compared with conventional 
education. On the assumption that the programs that offer training on the 
job  (MDTA-OJT, NYC,  JOBS) give six months of instruction per year 
while the others give twelve months per year, the training programs listed 
in Table 3 give instruction totaling 4.5 million student-months per year. By 
comparison, high schools give the 15 million students in grades 9-12 about 
135 million student-months per year of instruction. Further, the system of 
vocational education operated by the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare gives about 8 million student-months per year of training to 
secondary students (this  is  included in  the  135 million  figure for  high 
schools) and about 16 million student-months per year of instruction out- 
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programs for training disadvantaged  workers is equivalent to increasing the 
length of stay of each student in high school by about one month. 
A detailed evaluation of the impact of existing programs for training dis- 
advantaged workers or of the prospects for reducing unemployment by 
expanding the programs requires some exploration of the theoretical basis 
for these programs as weapons against unemployment. The notion of struc- 
tural unemployment had an important role in the justification of the early 
programs of the ARA and MDTA. The structural  theory held that a condi- 
tion of disequilibrium existed in certain markets, notably those for poorly 
trained, unskilled workers, where unemployment persisted because rigid- 
ities in wages inhibited the normal process of equilibration. Since the pre- 
vailing wage could not be brought low enough to induce employers to hire 
an unproductive poorly trained worker, it was thought necessary to raise 
the productivity of these workers to match the wage in order to put them to 
work. 
The development of extremely tight labor markets in the late 1960s re- 
vealed that the structural diagnosis was too simple. The view that unem- 
ployment is the difference  between the supply of labor and the demand for it 
cannot explain the behavior of labor markets when demand is strong, as I 
tried to demonstrate in my earlier article in Brookings Papers. Relatively 
high rates of unemployment were observed among disadvantaged workers 
in spite of the existence of vacancies in unskilled, low-paying jobs. Unem- 
ployment in these markets is a matter of high turnover, not of a chronic 
shortage of jobs.  The remedy of the structuralists still seemed relevant, 
however, since an unskilled worker who was frequently unemployed be- 
cause he could not be induced to stay on a low-paying job, might stay per- 
manently  on  a  higher-paying job  for  which  a training program might 
qualify him. Thus as labor markets tightened during the 1960s the rationale 
of training programs  changed from one of qualifying workers for any job at 
all to one of qualifying them for good jobs. 
ATTEMPTS AT EVALUATION 
A number of economists have attacked the problem of measuring the 
effects of training programs.9 The results have been almost uniformly fa- 
9. Einar Hardin  presents  a careful  review of nine studies in "Benefit-Cost  Analyses 
of  Occupational  Training Programs: A  Comparison of Recent Studies," in G.  G. 
Somers and W. D. Wood (eds.), Cost-Benefit Analysis of ManpowerPolicies,  Proceedings 
of a North American  Conference  (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University, Industrial 
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vorable to the programs, in the sense that the estimated benefits-mainly 
increased income to the trainee-exceed,  often by several times, the esti- 
mated costs-forgone  earnings of the trainee and operating costs of the 
program. An important study by Earl Main'0 attempts to estimate the ef- 
fects of institutional training under the MDTA. Of the many investigators 
who have made estimates of this type, Main pays the closest attention to 
the methodological problems that arise, of which the problem of choosing a 
control group is the most serious. Main began with a random sample of 
1,197 former trainees from forty-nine sample areas. In order to assess the 
effect of the program, he compared the employment and earnings of this 
group after training with those of a control group of similar individuals who 
did not receive training. Interviewers  selected members of the control group 
from among friends of the trainees who were unemployed at the time that 
the training program began. This method yielded 585 controls; an addi- 
tional 340 were selected by canvassing the neighborhoods where the trainees 
lived. The control group was reasonably well matched with the group of 
trainees in respect to race, sex, and age, but there was a substantial differ- 
ence in educational attainment: 49 percent of the trainees were graduates of 
high school, against only 32 percent of the controls. In order to adjust for 
this and other differences  in the compositions of the two groups, Main used 
a regression model with dummy variables for the following characteristics: 
sex, education, age, race, previous unemployment, whether or not the indi- 
vidual was the main earner in the family, region, marital status, and num- 
ber of unmarried  children under 18. He also included income per capita of 
the state where the individual lived. In addition, of course, he used a dummy 
variable indicating whether or not the individual was a trainee. He studied 
three left-hand variables: weekly wages for individuals at work, weekly 
family income for all individuals whether working or not (apparently indi- 
vidual income was not recorded), and the percentage of the time employed 
since the end of the training period. He found, first, no effect of training on 
weekly wages; second, an increase of $10.08 per week in income for fam- 
ilies that have trainees; and third, a difference  of 11 to 22 percentage  points 
in the employment rate for trainees. 
These results are only slightly less optimistic than those  of the cost- 
benefit studies mentioned earlier. But Main himself cautions against too 
optimistic an interpretation of them: 
10. "A Nationwide Evaluation of  M.D.T.A. Institutional Job Training,"  Journal 
of Human  Resources,  Vol. 3 (Spring 1968),  pp. 159-70. 678  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1971 
The major unresolved  question is how much of  the estimated net effect of 
training  on employment  is really  due to some other variable  not included  in the 
analysis....  It is probable that motivation,  intelligence,  or other factors have 
some contribution  to make. Those who want  jobs the most and who have the 
best minds  might  be most likely  both to find  employment  and to use every  avail- 
able  means  to obtain  employment,  including  MDTA  job training  courses.  There- 
fore, the true effect of training  on employment  may well be smaller  than the 
estimate  given in this report.11 
Some evidence reported by Main indicates that this warning must be 
taken very seriously. First, a problem arises in the manner of  selecting 
the sample of trainees: Only 79 percent of those selected for study could be 
located when the interviews were made more than a year after training was 
completed. The remaining 21 percent ahnost certainly had a less favorable 
employment experience  on the average, since an unemployed person is more 
likely to move without leaving a forwarding address. No  similar attrition 
took place in the control group, since it was selected at the time of the inter- 
views. The average employment rate of the trainees was apparently about 
65 percent.'2 If the employment rate for the trainees that could not be lo- 
cated were, say,  30 percent, then the  average employment rate for  all 
trainees would be 58 percent. The difference of 7 percentage points is a sub- 
stantial fraction of the estimated effect of training on the employment rate 
of 11 to 22 points. 
Second, the difference in the average educational attainment of the two 
groups is disturbing. The effect of education itself is removed through the 
use of regression, but the magnitude of the difference suggests the presence 
of other differences  between the two groups of precisely the sort that Main 
indicates. If differences in motivation,  intelligence, and the like  are not 
strongly correlated with the  observed characteristics, Main's conclusion 
needs serious qualification. 
The obstacles to  scientific evaluation of training programs are funda- 
mental and serious. Even a well-conceived and executed study such as 
Main's does not make a convincing case that training programs affect un- 
employment at all. Still, in the absence of knowledge of the effect of the 
programs on individuals, it is worth investigating the magnitude of the im- 
provement in the aggregate Phillips curve that might result from a program 
11. Ibid.,  p. 169. 
12. By employment  rate, I mean the fraction  of the trainees  who are employed.  Not 
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that had a known effect in  decreasing the unemployment of  individual 
trainees. The problem of translating individual into aggregate effects has 
been a bothersome one in the literature on the evaluation of manpower 
policies. Einar Hardin's review, cited earlier, contains a mystifying discus- 
sion of "vacuum," "displacement," and other effects that is an attempt to 
deal with the secondary impact on the economy of programs for upgrading 
workers. The newly trained worker may displace another worker, or if he 
was previously employed, another untrained worker may take his place 
when he moves up. For my purposes, the appropriate way to  study this 
problem is in terms of the shift in the Phillips curve induced by a training 
program. In particular, I seek to calculate the reduction in the average un- 
employment rate made possible by training, with the inflationary pressure 
in the labor market held constant. 
AN  ILLUSTRATIVE  MODEL 
I think it is useful in approaching this problem to work out the implica- 
tions of a simple model of the labor market that has only two markets, one 
for ordinary workers and the other for disadvantaged workers. Following 
Holt, I will assume that the rate of change of wages in each market, '1w  and 
w2,  responds only to the corresponding unemployment rates, ul and U2, in a 
way described by a pair of simple Phillips curves: 
(1)  IW' =  U-a  Ui 
and 
(2)  W2  b2 _a2. 
U2 
If both rates of wage increase are constant at a reference level, k, which I 
will hold fixed for the rest of the analysis, then 
(3)  Ul=k  b 
k+  a, 
and 
(4)  U2  =  2_ 
(  )  2  ~~~~~k  +  a2 
For example, if a,  =  8, a2  =  2, bl  =  b2  =  42, and k  =  4 percent per year 
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and U2 =  7 percent unemployment among disadvantaged workers. If dis- 
advantaged workers are, say, 29 percent of the labor force, then the average 
unemployment rate is 4.5 percent. Now suppose that some of the disadvan- 
taged workers are upgraded and enter the market for ordinary workers; 
then the unemployment rate will fall and the rate of inflation rise in the 
market for disadvantaged workers, and just the opposite will occur in the 
market for ordinary workers. As the ratio of w2  to wi  increases as a result, 
the demand for ordinary workers will increase relative to that for disadvan- 
taged workers. Eventually the two-to-one relationship between U2  and u1 
will be restored. If aggregate economic policy is adjusted throughout this 
period to maintain the same average rate of inflation, then the rate of infla- 
tion in both markets will be the reference level, k, at the conclusion. Equa- 
tions (3) and (4) indicate that the two unemployment rates, ui  and u2, will 
have their old  values at the  end  of  the  adjustment as well.  What has 
changed in  the  economy? First,  the  average unemployment rate, u  = 
(1 -  d)ul +  du2, has fallen since d, the fraction of the labor force that is 
disadvantaged, has fallen.  Second, the real output of the economy  has 
increased. Third, the wage level of the remaining disadvantaged workers 
has increased.13 
The preceding argument has suggested that the experience of individual 
workers can be used to estimate the aggregate effect of training programs 
on the unemployment rate (holding the rate of inflation constant) without 
any adjustment for the response of the economy to the training programs. 
Partial and general equilibrium coincide. But the empirical studies cited 
earlier do not support an optimistic view of the aggregate effects of these 
programs. They suggest that, at its best, an expanded program for training 
disadvantaged  workers, operating for several  years, might remove 8 percent 
of them from their disadvantaged status. This corresponds to a reduction of 
about 0.02 in d, and to a reduction from 4.50 to 4.42 in the average unem- 
ployment rate. No  plausible alternative set of parameters in this simple 
model yields any substantial reduction in the overall unemployment rate 
from a policy that reduces d by 0.02. For example, if a,  =  13.3 and a2  = 
0.33, then ul  =  2.42 and U2 =  9.69. A reduction in d from 0.286 to 0.263 
(8 percent) reduces u from 4.50 to 4.33. Whatever their merit as weapons 
13. This assumes  that the parameters  al, a2, bi, and b2 of the Phillips  curves  do not 
depend  on the levels  of the two wages.  Alternatively  a, might  decrease  and a2  increase  as 
W2/Wl increased.  It is not possible to state in which direction this would change the 
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against poverty, training programs cannot bring about a substantial shift in 
the Phillips curve. 
The Shortage of Good Jobs 
Even during the period of extremely tight labor markets from 1966 to 
1969, one frequently heard, especially from black leaders, of the urgent 
need for more jobs, and of the possibility, if these jobs were provided, of the 
reduction of certain critically high unemployment rates to levels more con- 
sistent with social stability. I tried to show in my paper, referred  to above, 
that the problem was not that workers in groups with high unemployment 
have trouble finding  jobs but that they have trouble keeping them. In other 
words, the simple diagnosis of groups of workers unable to find any jobs at 
all even when labor markets in general are tight is untenable. Was the 
passionate demand for more jobs in the late sixties entirely spurious? The 
answer to this question is of considerable importance because even more 
today than at that time, proposals for the creation of jobs through subsidy 
or direct employment receive serious consideration in Congress. 
In the late sixties several economists began to work out a resolution of 
the paradox of a shortage of jobs in an overheated economy. The resulting 
body of thought is somewhat loosely called the "dual theory."14 The dual- 
ity is between two sectors of the labor market: the primary sector, offering 
good jobs with high wages, satisfactory working conditions, stability, and 
prospects for promotion, and the secondary sector, offering bad jobs with 
poor wages and conditions, frequent layoffs, and no hope of advancement. 
A favored portion of the labor force, particularly  adult white males, enjoys 
the benefits of employment in the primary sector, while the rest-women, 
teenagers, and members of  minorities-suffer  from confinement to  the 
secondary market, where, in particular, a great deal of turnover and con- 
sequent unemployment are observed. The problem, then, is not a shortage 
of jobs, but a shortage of good jobs. The force of this theory as an empirical 
generalization cannot be denied. For  example, it predicts not  only that 
14. David M. Gordon  gives  a complete  account  of the development  of the dual theory 
in "Economic  Theories  of Poverty  and Underemployment"  (January  1971; processed), 
pp. 69-91. 
The leading  proponent  is Michael  J. Piore; see his "Jobs  and Training,"  in Samuel  H. 
Beer and Richard E. Barringer  (eds.), The State and the Poor (Winthrop, 1970), and 
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white males will have higher wages than the other race-sex groups, but that 
their wages will rise more with age. Both of these predictions are strikingly 
confirmed in the results depicted in Figure 3 of my earlier paper.15  The 
dual theory has struck such a responsive chord among economists and 
others that it has had an important role in the diagnoses of the problems 
of modern labor markets presented by the administration and the Com- 
mittee for Economic Development.16 
To  qualify as a theory, the dual theory must go beyond an empirical 
generalization to a deeper explanation of what is observed. In particular, 
it must deal with the objection that the forces of the market would tend to 
remove any disparity in wage rates between the two sectors. If labor were 
cheaper in the secondary market, the objection goes, the profit-maximizing 
entrepreneur  would discharge his primary workers and hire only from the 
secondary market. The shift in demand would continue until the wage rates 
and other costs of labor were equalized and the distinction between the 
primary and secondary markets abolished. The dual theory must invoke 
some force, counteracting the natural force of the market, to explain the 
continued existence of a differential in wages between the markets. The 
writings of Piore and others17  have emphasized three basic explanations of 
the duality of the labor market: restrictive practices, discrimination, and 
low productivity of secondary workers because of their previous experience 
in the secondary market. 
The  principal restrictive practice discussed by  Piore  is  occupational 
licensing. For example, a young black finds it hard to enter the skilled trades 
because licensing boards act in the interest of already licensed workers to 
make it as difficult as possible for employment to increase. To  an econ- 
omist, the main purpose of licensing appears to be to translate an increase 
in demand for a given trade into an increase in wages rather than in em- 
ployment. 
Piore  distinguishes  two  kinds  of  discrimination  against  secondary 
workers, discrimination  pure and simple and statistical discrimination.  Dis- 
15. "Why Is the Unemployment  Rate So High?" p. 394. For more details see my 
"Wages,  Income and Hours of Work,"  in Glen Cain and Harold Watts (eds.), Income 
Maintenance  and  Labor  Supply  Econometric  Studies  (University  of Wisconsin,  Institute 
for Research  on Poverty,  forthcoming). 
16. Manpower  Report  of the  President,  April  1971,  Chap. 3; Committee  for Economic 
Development,  Training  and  Jobs  for the Urban  Poor (CED, 1970). 
17. Piore, "Jobs and Training,"  and Doeringer  and Piore, Internal  Labor  Markets, 
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crimination pure and simple excludes blacks and other workers from pri- 
mary employment because of the prejudices  of employers, or, perhaps more 
important, of employees.18 Statistical discrimination is a more subtle phe- 
nomenon. If employers have trouble identifying productive workers, they 
may rely on characteristics, notably skin color,  that have nothing to do 
with productivity but that are correlated with it. Thus an exceptional black 
worker has difficulty getting a good job partly because employers will not 
be able to identify him as exceptional and will assume that he is closer to 
the average of all blacks than he is in fact. Where information is hard to 
get, this kind of behavior on the part of employers is perfectly rational. As 
Kenneth Arrow has pointed out, the existence of statistical discrimination 
removes a good part of the incentive for any individual black worker to im- 
prove his own productivity.19  There may be a self-sustaining  equilibrium  in 
which blacks receive lower wages and  have lower productivity for  no 
reason other than this vicious circle. 
Finally, Piore observes that entrapment in the secondary market causes 
workers to acquire habits of work that are inappropriate for primary  jobs, 
and that are difficult  to shed when they are offered good jobs. In particular, 
a secondary worker has a more casual devotion to his job, reporting for 
work late or not at all on some days, and quitting without any good reason, 
often within months of taking the job. Piore emphasizes that it is habits of 
work and attitudes about the job, not so much the technology of produc- 
tion or the specific skills of the worker, that distinguish the primary from 
the secondary market. 
Of the three forces tending to maintain the duality of the labor market, 
only restrictive institutions and discrimination are fundamental causes. 
The damaging effect of secondary  jobs on secondary workers tends to rein- 
force these causes, and would preserve  the duality for a considerable length 
of time if restrictive institutions and discrimination could be eliminated, 
but it is not a basic cause and could not account for the duality of the labor 
market by itself. Thus, starting from the empirical  datum that the secondary 
18. The mere  existence  of prejudiced  employers  or employees  is not necessarily  harm- 
ful to the wages  of minority  members,  as Gary  S. Becker  has observed  in The Economics 
of Discrimination (University  of Chicago Press, 1957),  p. 37. But even the most refined 
estimates  of the differential  between  the wages of similarly  qualified  whites and blacks 
suggests  that it is substantial;  see Michael D. Hurd, "Changes  in Wage Rates between 
1959  and 1967,"  Review of Economics and Statistics,  Vol.  53 (May 1971),  pp. 189-99. 
19. "Some Models of Racial Discrimination  in the Labor Market,"  RM-6253-RC 
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market or something like it exists, Piore's theory differs from, say, the 
theory that disadvantaged workers lack skills, in asserting that the major 
problems of the labor market would disappear through time if discrimina- 
tion and restrictive institutions were eliminated. 
The proponents of the dual theory of the labor market pay little attention 
to the role of labor unions in maintaining the shortage of good jobs. Yet 
this  subject merits investigation, since, among blue collar workers, the 
distinction between union and nonunion jobs is almost the same as that 
between primary and secondary jobs. Unions can create an artificial scar- 
city of jobs in two ways: direct control over entry to an occupation, com- 
mon only in craft unions, or indirect control through the wage rate, the 
usual case in industrial unions. For example, there is a shortage of jobs as 
electricians for the clearly visible reason that the number of apprentices is 
closely controlled. There is a shortage of jobs as automobile workers for the 
more subtle reason that the United Auto Workers have succeeded in nego- 
tiating a wage high enough so that the automobile makers, who make the 
decision about hiring and firing, decide to hire systematically  fewer workers 
than are interested in working at the high wage level. The two methods of 
control come to essentially the same thing. 
SOURCES OF WAGE  DIFFERENTIALS 
To assess the importance of the phenomena cited by the dual theory re- 
quires estimates of the quantitative impact of restrictive institutions (in- 
cluding unions) and discrimination. In principle these estimates call for a 
comparison of employment and wages by occupation before and after re- 
form. The best that I can offer, however, are rough measures of the wage 
differentials  in the economy as it stands, or, rather, as it stood in 1967. 
From the same body of data used in my earlier study of unemployment,20 
I have estimated percentage differentials in wages associated with union 
membership, employment by government, and occupation. The model un- 
derlying these estimates is the following: The wage equals the wage base, 
as determined by age, education, and other personal characteristics, times 
(1 plus differential  if a union member) times (1 plus differential  if employed 
by government) times (1 plus difierential for occupation). 
20. The 1967  Survey  of Economic  Opportunity,  conducted  by the U.S. Bureau  of the 
Census.  For further  discussion  of this source  of data, see my "Wages,  Income  and Hours 
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I distinguish eight separate union differentials by geographic location 
(urban and rural areas in four parts of the country), four kinds of govern- 
ment employment (postal, other federal, state, and local), and eleven occu- 
pations. The occupational differentials  are measured  relative  to the wages of 
operatives. I estimated the differentials  in the model just stated by defining 
a regression equation in which the left-hand variable is the natural log- 
arithm of the wage and the right-hand variables are dummy variables for 
union membership, employment by government, and occupation. The re- 
gression coefficients of the dummy variables  then are direct estimates of the 
proportional differentials.  Dummy variables  for age and years of education 
(and interactions between them), health, residence at age 16 (foreign or 
United States), and part-time work are included as determinants  of the base 
wage. Thus the estimated differentials are fully adjusted, for example, for 
the different age and educational compositions of the union and nonunion 
groups in the labor force. This study is open to precisely the kind of criti- 
cism I directed at Main's study of the effects of training programs: omission 
of unmeasured characteristics  biases the coefficients of the characteristics 
that are included. I will return to this point shortly. 
Estimates were made separately for the four race-sex groups; these re- 
sults are shown in Table 4. The differentials for union membership are 
roughly consistent with previous studies, although they are perhaps slightly 
higher.21  In all four regions, the union differential is generally higher in 
rural than in urban areas. This is especially true for white males. Among the 
four regions, the union differentials seem to be highest in the South and 
lowest in the Northeast. The differentials for government employment are 
positive for fifteen out of the sixteen cases. They tend to be smallest for 
white males among the four race-sex groups. Finally, except for private 
household workers, farmers,  and farm laborers,  the differentials  for occupa- 
tional groups tend to be small, indicating that most of the differences  in the 
average wages by occupation can be explained by differences in personal 
characteristics. 
These estimates of the differentials  in wages associated with union mem- 
bership, government employment, and occupation do not by themselves 
measure the impact of restrictive institutions on the distribution of earn- 
ings among the members of the labor force. The estimate that the wage of a 
white female union member in the urban North Central  region is 20 percent 
21. See Harold Gregg Lewis, Unionism  and Relative Wages  in the United  States: An 
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Table 4.  Wage Differentials  Associated with Union Membership, 
Government  Employment,  and Occupation,  by Color and Sex, 1967 
Percentage  difference 
White  Black  Whlite  Black 
Chlaracteristic  males  males  females  females 
bniona  membership 
Urban Northeast  0.12  0.11  0.09  0.00 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Rural Northeast  0.22  ...  0.18  -0.28 
(0.60)  (0.12)  (0.55) 
Urban North Central  0.16  0.24  0.20  0.04 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Rural North Central  0.30  ...  0.21 
(0.04)  (0.10) 
Urban South  0.24  0.34  0.24  0.22 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Rural South  0.31  0.33  0.23  0.49 
(0.03)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.11) 
Urban West  0.17  0.22  0.18  0.06 
(0.02)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.06) 
Rural West  0.29  ...  0.02 
(0.08)  (0.19) 
Government  employment 
Post Office  Department  0.06  0.28  0.38  0.38 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.09)  (0.06) 
Other  federal  0.22  0.25  0.27  0.22 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
State  0.07  0.11  0.14  -0.03 
(0.04)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.08) 
Local  0.11  0.23  0.07  0.10 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.06) 
Occupational  group 
Professional  and technical  0.21  0.20  0.29  0.40 
(0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Farmers  -0.32  ...  ... 
(0.10) 
Managers,  officials,  and proprietors  0.26  0.09  0.19  0.20 
(0.02)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.08) 
Clerical  workers  0.04  0.02  0.13  0.09 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
Sales workers  0.08  -0.12  -0.18  -0.12 
(0.02)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.06) Robert E. Hall  687 
Table 4  (continued) 
Wlhite  Black  White  Black 
Characteristic  males  males  females  females 
Craftsmen  0.16  0.11  0.01  0.07 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
Operatives  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Private  household workers  -0.60  -0.23  -0.58  -0.41 
(0.21)  (0.19)  (0.04)  (0.02) 
Service workers  -0.15  -0.16  -0.19  -0.11 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Farm laborers  -0.43  -0.46  -0.47  -0.39 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.13)  (0.06) 
Other  laborers  -0.07  -0.04  -0.16  -0.05 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.09)  (0.08) 
Number  of observations  9,603  4,360  5,690  3,611 
Standard  error  of percentage  differential  0.409  0.371  0.443  0.389 
Source: Estimated by author from the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity conducted by the U.S. 
Bureau of  the Census, unpublished tabulations. Data  are for all  private wage and salary workers and 
government employees. Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
higher than the wage of a similar woman who is not a union member tells 
little about the effect of unions without information about the proportion of 
these women who are members of unions. In order to give a systematic ac- 
count of the total impact of restrictive institutions, I have calculated the 
frequency distribution of the wage differentials  received by all of the mem- 
bers of the labor force. This distribution appears in Figure 1 for the effects 
of union membership  and government  employment (but not occupation) on 
the earnings of the entire labor force and of the four race-sex groups. The 
results for the entire labor force show that 78 percent of all workers receive 
essentially no benefit (0.0 to 0.10 differential)  from these two restrictive in- 
stitutions, while 8 percent of all workers receive a differential of more than 
0.20.  The disaggregation by race-sex groups shows that almost all of the 
benefits accrue to men: 91 percent of white females and 94 percent of black 
females receive differentials of 0.10 or lower. For men, differences between 
races are not conspicuous. A slightly lower proportion of black males re- 
ceives a differential  of 0.10 or lower, but the average is somewhat higher for 
blacks than for whites. Taken together, the results of Figure 1 do not sup- 
port the hypothesis that the two restrictive institutions, unions and civil 
service, divide the labor force into primary and secondary sectors. Rather, 688  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1971 
Figure 1.  Frequency  Distribution  within  the Labor Force of Wage 
Differentials  Associated with Union Membership  and Government 
Employment,  by Color and Sex, 1967 
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these institutions seem to provide certain limited benefits to a fairly small 
proportion of the male labor force. 
The estimated differentials  by occupational groups measure less precisely 
the effects of restrictive institutions. To some extent, the fact that black 
male craftsmen receive wages 18 percent higher than those of black opera- 
tives merely indicates unmeasured differences  between the individuals who 
are craftsmen and those who are operatives.22  On the other hand, part of 
the differential must be attributed to the restrictive institutions associated 
with more highly paid occupations-for  example, occupational licensing in 
the case of craftsmen. A treatment of occupational differences  in wages that 
attributes  them all to restrictive  institutions gives an upper bound to the im- 
pact of these institutions. 
Distributions of wage differentials  including occupational differentials  in 
the labor force appear in Figure 2.  These distributions are much more 
favorable to  the hypothesis of the dual labor market. Within the entire 
labor force, the differentials are distributed roughly symmetrically around 
zero, and do not cluster at zero. These results are consistent with the notion 
of an important secondary sector in the labor market in which workers do 
not receive the protection of restrictive  institutions associated with occupa- 
tion. It does not appear to be feasible to make separate estimates of the ef- 
fect of  identifiable restrictive institutions. Those included in Figure 2- 
unions and the civil service-contribute  relatively little to the dispersion of 
the distributions of wage differentials. The dual theory remains simply a 
persuasive conjecture without strong empirical support. 
The JOBS Program 
In 1968 President Johnson announced a large-scale response to the de- 
mand for more jobs, in the form of a program called Job Opportunities in 
the Business Sector, or JOBS. The idea was to stimulate employers, through 
subsidy and exhortation, to offer good jobs to workers who were previously 
unable to find them. A private organization, the National Alliance of Busi- 
nessmen (NAB),  was created for the purpose of locating prospective em- 
ployers, and funds were made available through the Manpower Adminis- 
tration to  subsidize employers by paying the extra costs of training and 
22. U.S. Bureau  of the Census,  Current  Population  Reports,  Series  P-60, No. 80, "In- 
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Figure  2.  Frequency  Distribution  within  the Labor Force of Wage 
Differentials  Associated with Union Membership,  Government 
Employment,  and Occupation,  by Color and Sex, 1967 
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other expenses incurred  in the first few months of employment of the disad- 
vantaged and  hard-core unemployed workers.  This  program is  worth 
studying in detail, since the present administration has chosen JOBS as the 
central part of its manpower program. 
JOBS is a strikingly large program. Between March 1968 and September 
1970, 560,000 workers were hired under its provisions.23  There is no reason 
to suppose, however, that anywhere close to this number of workers were 
placed in good jobs. No systematic data have been published on the nature 
of the jobs filled under the program, and until recently at least, no working 
system existed for collecting the data from employers. An investigator from 
the General Accounting Office stated: "We reviewed the files of 158 com- 
panies [in San Francisco] that pledged jobs in 1968 and 324 that pledged 
jobs in 1969, and found that 26 (16.4 percent) and 33 (10.2 percent), respec- 
tively, were offering jobs which appeared to be in high-turnover occupa- 
tions involving minimum skills and low wages. These included employment 
as janitors, messengers, maids, porters, dishwashers, busboys, potwashers, 
copy boys, and bar assistants, many of which were at wage rates of less than 
$2.00 an hour."24  A large portion of the rest of the jobs are apparently only 
just above this level. Concern about the quality of the jobs has led recently 
to the development of a formal "Occupational Opportunities Rating Sys- 
tem," which is used to rule out JOBS projects "offering  jobs below mini- 
mum standards of skill content, potential progress, and stability."25 
JOBS consists of two  distinct programs. The first involves on-the-job 
training subsidized through contracts with the Manpower Administration. 
The second is totally unsubsidized. In both cases, the NAB  is responsible 
for locating employers who are willing to take on disadvantaged workers. 
The subsidy paid in the contract part of the program is relatively small, 
averaging nationally between $2,500 and $3,000 per trainee26  and about 75 
percent of the jobs filled under the program have been in the noncontract 
part.27 The Manpower Administration has consistently failed to spend its 
23. Manpower  Report  of the President,  April  1971, p. 44. 
24. "Prepared  Statement  of Henry  Eschwege,  Associate  Director,  Civil  Division, U.S. 
General  Accounting  Office,  Washington,  D.C.," in Manpower  Development  and  Training 
Legislation,  1970, Hearings  before the Subcommittee  on Employment,  Manpower,  and 
Poverty  of the Senate Committee  on Labor  and Public  Welfare,  91 Cong. 1 and 2 sess. 
(1970), Pt. 4, p. 2226. 
25. Manpower  Report  of the President,  April  1971, p. 44. 
26. "Statement  of Henry Eschwege,"  p. 2228. 
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appropriation  for training  contracts  under  JOBS,  often by wide margins: 
Of the $624  million  appropriated  for JOBS  between  March  1968  and the 
end of February  1970,  just over  half  ($348  million)  had been  obligated  and 
less  than  a sixth  ($96.9  million)  had  actually  been  paid  to contractors.28  Ap- 
parently  some of the contracts  have  involved  an unrealistically  large  num- 
ber of training  slots, and payments  under  these contracts  (based on the 
actual  number  of days of training)  are well under  the original  amount  of 
the contract.29 
The  absence  of suitable  data  makes  it difficult  to appraise  JOBS  as a pro- 
gram  for offering  good jobs to disadvantaged  workers.  My tentative  im- 
pression,  however,  is that the overall  impact  of the program  is very  much 
smaller  than is suggested  by the number  of workers  enrolled  in it. Under- 
neath  its modern  dress  of "job  development"  and "sensitivity  training,"  the 
contract  part of JOBS  is no more than a conventional  training  program, 
suffering  from all of the defects  of these  programs  and another  large one 
besides:  The contractors  often have no previous  experience  in operating 
training  programs.  Since  the contracts  pay only for the costs of training, 
and  do that only  for a few  months,  the  program  does  nothing  to induce  em- 
ployers  to offer good jobs. The unsubsidized  noncontract  part of JOBS 
seems  to operate  in the following  way: An executive  of a large  enterprise 
becomes  enthusiastic  about  the program  and inaugurates  a policy to em- 
ploy disadvantaged  workers  in good  jobs under  a carefully  arranged  pro- 
gram  with  extensive  supportive  services.  Programs  of this kind  are,  I think, 
the one clear  success  of JOBS,  although  it should  be recognized  that  many 
large  employers  had already  begun  to undertake  this kind of activity  well 
before  JOBS  was created.  The enthusiastic  executive  also becomes  a mis- 
sionary  for JOBS.  Through  the NAB, he solicits  pledges  from other em- 
ployers  to do the same kind of thing. But many of the other  employers, 
especially  small ones, have neither  the enthusiasm  nor the means  to run 
serious  programs.  The path of least resistance  is to make a pledge  and to 
fulfill  it by employing  disadvantaged  workers  in the same  kinds  of  jobs they 
have had in the past. Reliance  on altruism  seems  to work mainly  in big 
business.  JOBS does not seem to have been successful,  through either 
persuasion  or subsidy,  in inducing  employers  other  than  very  large  corpora- 
tions to offer  good  jobs to disadvantaged  or secondary  workers. 
28. Ibid. 
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Public Employment 
The disappointing record of JOBS in trying to induce private employers 
to provide more good jobs has caused attention to turn to an alternative 
policy, the creation of jobs  directly in the government. In discussion of 
proposals of this kind, the distinction between movements along the Phillips 
curve and shifts of the curve itself is especially important. Many of the pro- 
posals of the past year (with 6 percent unemployment) amount to almost 
pure movement along the Phillips curve, in that they provide temporary 
employment for unemployed workers in general. This kind of increase in 
the demand for labor is probably just as inflationary as any other, and 
would put the economy at a point of lower unemployment and higher in- 
flation that could also be achieved by a variety of other policies for stimu- 
lating  demand. Until  August  15,  1971, the  administration argued that 
general stimulation of the economy was inappropriate. Consistent with 
this view, the President vetoed the Employment and Manpower Act  of 
1970, which provided about $3 billion for subsidizing employment in state 
and local governments. 
Congress had, in fact, embodied in the law some restrictions that made 
its effect on the demand for labor selective enough, in principle, to create 
less inflation per point of reduction in the unemployment rate than would 
a policy  of  general stimulation of  demand through monetary or fiscal 
policy. These provisions were strengthened in a new bill, the Emergency 
Employment Act of 1971, which the President signed in July 1971. It pro- 
vides $2.25 billion for jobs in state and local governments.  It has the follow- 
ing provisions designed to have a selective effect on the demand for labor: 
1. The jobs  must lead to  permanent employment (not  necessarily in 
government) and must be in fields that will have increased demand in the 
future. The administration has been adamant that the program not create 
what it calls "dead-end"  jobs.  On the other hand, the law expires in two 
years, so the governments  have to be prepared  to finance the new jobs fairly 
soon, or to place workers in private industry. 
2.  Workers must have been previously unemployed or underemployed, 
except for supporting personnel. Preference  is to be given to veterans of the 
war in Vietnam, welfare recipients, participants in training programs, and 
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3.  Professionals may account for no more than a third of total employ- 
ment in the program of any single government. Each may be paid no more 
than $12,000. 
4.  The new jobs must represent an actual increase in the number of jobs 
in existence and federal funds may not displace other funds. 
Powerful forces exist to translate the effect of this law into a movement 
along the Phillips curve, rather than a shift in the curve, in spite of the pro- 
visions just listed. In the first place, a two-year subsidy is not a satisfactory 
method for inducing governments to offer permanent  jobs. If, even at full 
employment, there is already a shortage of good jobs in the private econ- 
omy, the effects of this policy as a training program will be small. The 
fundamental defect of the law is its failure to have any long-run impact on 
the demand for labor. Even in the short run, the intent of the law will be 
subverted. The only compulsory restriction on the kind of workers hired 
under the Emergency Employment Act is that they must be unemployed or 
underemployed at the time they are hired (even this does not apply to ad- 
ministrative and other higher-level personnel). With 6 percent of the labor 
force now unemployed, including an atypical proportion of workers laid off 
from good jobs, this requirement  imposes hardly any constraint on hiring. 
State and local governments will hire exactly the same workers who would 
be hired in the private economy if there were a general expansion in de- 
mand, so in this respect the law will induce no shift at all in the Phillips 
curve. Some of the other restrictions on the character of the new employ- 
ment may have favorable effects on the composition of demand, depending 
on how they are enforced. If governments  can meet the requirement  for hir- 
ing disadvantaged  workers by increases in the number of janitors hired, for 
example, these requirements will come to nothing. 
It appears that the Emergency Employment Act is mainly a policy to re- 
duce unemployment by moving along the Phillips curve, in spite of the ad- 
ministration's attempts to make it something else. It competes with other 
policies for expanding demand, perhaps  with a slight advantage, but cannot 
serve as a model for federal policy for shifting the composition of the de- 
mand for labor in a way that is favorable for disadvantaged workers. In 
the concluding section of this paper I discuss briefly the form that a pro- 
gram for bringing about a true shift in the composition of demand might 
take. This program, contractual in form, would be suitable for inducing 
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Experience  with the Creation of Good Jobs 
A number of large corporations have instituted programs for offering 
good jobs to disadvantaged workers. The experiences of several of these 
are reviewed in a volume edited by Peter B. Doeringer,30  covering Western 
Electric, IBM, Westinghouse, Equitable Life Assurance, and General Elec- 
tric. Of these, I will discuss Edward Banfield's chapter on IBM31  because it 
presents data on the cost of the program as well as an evaluation of its 
effect. IBM's plan was to offer employment in a modern industrial  environ- 
ment to workers whose previous experience was in low-paying, unstable 
jobs. It opened a plant in the Bedford-Stuyvesant  section of Brooklyn and 
recruited production workers for it locally. Unskilled workers were offered 
relatively low starting wages, $2.12 per hour plus substantial fringe bene- 
fits, but IBM made it clear that the jobs were secure and offered definite 
chances for promotion. It was apparent that there was a shortage of this 
kind of job, since IBM received 2,565 applications for the 87 positions that 
were filled in the summer and fall of 1968. Selection from among the ap- 
plicants was explicitly on the basis of expected productivity, mainly be- 
cause IBM wanted to be able to promote the new workers rapidly. Still, 
for many of the workers hired, the jobs with IBM were obviously very 
much better than the other jobs open to them. For example, 19 percent of 
the men selected had been in prison and 35 percent of the men and 64 per- 
cent of the women had been unemployed for six weeks or more before 
applying. 
In spite of the data on costs and productivity presented by Banfield, it is 
difficult to  estimate how much it cost IBM to produce in the new plant 
rather than in its established suburban plants. Before the plant began op- 
eration, its manager estimated that it would cost $500,000 per year for the 
first few years, with an average employment of about 300 local workers. 
This is under $2,000 per worker per year and includes the cost of on-the-job 
training, so it compares favorably to the average cost of training under 
JOBS. Banfield reports that the productivity of the workers in Bedford- 
Stuyvesant rose from a fifth of that of ordinary workers to half within a 
few months, and that it appeared  likely to rise further  as additional learning 
30. Programs To Employ the Disadvanztaged  (Prentice-Hall,  1969). 
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took  place. Since the new workers were paid less than the experienced 
workers at other plants, the cost of the direct labor input at the new plant 
was not very much greater than the cost at the old plants. However, most 
of IBM's costs are indirect, and it is difficult to compare these costs be- 
tween the plants; for one example, the new plant used the medical services 
of  IBM's Manhattan office without charge. High-level  executives spent 
considerable time in organizing and supervising  the new plant, which again 
was not charged specifically to  it. My rough impression from Banfield's 
discussion is that the program cost $3,000 or $4,000 per worker per year in 
the actual cost of the operation, imputed costs of services received from 
other parts of IBM, and forgone profits. 
IBM's new employees seem to have reacted favorably to their new jobs. 
Turnover was less than expected: Out of an average labor force of about 
fifty in the first six months, there were two quits and three firings. Ab- 
senteeism, which was about the same as at IBM's suburban plants, was 
far less than expected. In general, there seems to be little evidence that the 
employees brought the pathological conditions of their previous employ- 
ment with them to IBM. Although the benefits of the program are hard to 
quantify, it is quite clearly feasible, if at a fairly high price, to provide good 
jobs to selected members of a group in the labor force whose previous jobs 
were unstable and low paid. The problem facing the designers of federal 
manpower policy is to discover a way to persuade employers to engage in 
programs of this kind on a vastly larger scale. 
Conclusions 
The tone of my survey of alternative proposals for shifting the Phillips 
curve has been generally negative. I found little evidence that a large ex- 
pansion of existing programs could accomplish very much. The Employ- 
ment Service already does a fairly complete job of listing openings in cer- 
tain sectors of the economy, but is not well suited to other sectors. Neither 
intensive nor extensive expansion has much prospect for decreasing unem- 
ployment. Training programs-both  those to increase occupational mobil- 
ity, as suggested by Holt, and those to make disadvantaged workers more 
productive-have  been a serious disappointment even at their present scale. 
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the CEP and JOBS, suffers from excessive turnover and an inability to 
place its graduates in good jobs. 
The hypothesis that the basic problem in the labor market is a shortage 
of good jobs seems capable of explaining the failure of conventional man- 
power policy and suggests, in its place, policies to  provide good jobs to 
disadvantaged workers. Two recent federal policies that seem to have this 
objective, embodied in JOBS and the Emergency Employment Act of 1971, 
fail for opposite reasons-in  the first case because JOBS does not generally 
offer good jobs, and in the second because the Emergency  Employment Act 
jobs probably will not go to disadvantaged workers. 
The main ray of hope in my survey is the apparent  success of limited pro- 
grams to  offer good jobs  in large firms to  disadvantaged workers. The 
actions of these firms suggest that they have a certain amount of social 
conscience and thus a certain commitment to the goal of helping the dis- 
advantaged, and are less susceptible to  the pressures undercutting pro- 
grams than are businesses and governments that act purely in their own 
interests. It is probably neither feasible nor desirable for government policy 
to  try to  foster the  development of  social  conscience elsewhere in  the 
economy, especially since that which exists now has an uncanny correla- 
tion with monopoly power. The problem at hand, then, is to design a fed- 
eral program that makes it in an employer's own interest to offer good jobs 
to disadvantaged workers. 
There are, I think, three basic kinds of policies to accomplish this: fed- 
eral contracts, taxes, and employment quotas. Contracts with the Man- 
power Administration have been the form through which the federal part 
of JOBS has been administered, and the experience of that program is sug- 
gestive of the advantages and disadvantages of administration  through con- 
tracts. In principle, contracting is a powerful and flexible tool for imposing 
federal policy on businesses and governments. Plans are reviewed in ad- 
vance and no applicant receives a contract as a matter of right. In JOBS, 
at least, very few of the advantages of contracting are realized, however. 
Payment is for direct expenses of training, including a limited allowance for 
wages during on-the-job training. The result has been to stimulate expendi- 
tures on peripheral training that has identifiable costs and to discourage 
employment in jobs where there is any gap between the wage paid and the 
productivity of disadvantaged workers. It seems to me that the principle 
of reimbursement for costs should be purged entirely from federal con- 
tracts for developing good jobs. It has hurt JOBS very badly by making 698  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1971 
the contracts so unattractive that the Manpower Administration has been 
able to negotiate only relatively few, and those only by imposing almost no 
standards on the nature of the jobs they cover. If this requirement were 
eliminated, and the government were instead to pay an explicit subsidy 
large enough to make the contracts attractive, strong standards could be 
imposed on both the nature of the jobs created and on the kind of workers 
chosen to fill them. Since one of the main purposes of this program would 
be to create a stronger attachment between  job and worker, contracts could 
contain specific provision rewarding an employer for reducing turnover in 
his work force. 
Table 5 presents estimates of the cost and impact of a contractual em- 
ployment program of realistic scale. The proposed program would last 
three years for each job and would subsidize the job by $4,000 in the first 
year, $3,000 in the second, and $2,000 in the third. My estimates assume an 
attrition rate of 20 percent per year, very much lower than the rates in 
existing training programs, but higher than those reported for the pro- 
grams of large corporations. They assume that the new workers are drawn 
from a population with a 10 percent unemployment rate, that unemploy- 
ment is nonexistent among the workers covered by the contracts, and that 
the newly created job-worker combinations are associated with a 4.5 per- 
cent unemployment rate after completion of the program.32  The estimated 
impact of the program is small. Many years of  operation would be  re- 
quired to reduce the unemployment rate by even 0.1 percentage point, say 
from 4.5 to 4.4 percent. A scale two or three times larger than that assumed 
in Table 5 might yield a proportionately larger decrease in unemployment, 
but this kind of contractual program seems unlikely to achieve any sub- 
stantial reduction in unemployment. As the program expanded, it would 
become increasingly difficult to find productive activities suitable for up- 
grading or expansion that were not  protected by powerful interests. It 
would take more than the kind of contract proposed here to open up addi- 
tional good jobs in the building trades, for example. 
A  comprehensive tax policy seems to  be an attractive alternative to  a 
contractual program exactly because of its large scale. The provisions of 
the federal tax on corporate income automatically influence the behavior 
32. Note that unemployment  is assumed to fall not by the total number of jobs 
created  but by 10 percent  of those employed  under  the program  and 5.5 percent  of those 
who complete  it. This embodies  the main point of view of the paper  that all calculations 
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of every business in the country of any size. The tax credit on investment 
provides a natural model for this kind of policy. The difficulty in designing 
a tax policy for shifting the Phillips curve lies in the subtlety of the goal. 
Throughout its history, the investment credit has been used mainly as a 
countercyclical device; it has been put on  and taken off in attempts to 
avoid under- and over-full employment, as an alternative  to or in conjunc- 
tion with decreases or increases in tax rates. A credit on employment could 
be used for the same purpose. But policies of this sort induce movements 
along the Phillips curve, not shifts of the curve itself. What is needed is a 
highly selective tax to bring about a shift in the composition of the demand 
for labor. This might take the form of a tax credit for long-term employ- 
ment of disadvantaged  workers. Enforcement of the tax laws would require 
a method for certifying workers eligible for the credit; this would probably 
involve the Manpower Administration. There does not  seem to  be  any 
large difference  between administration  through the tax system and through 
contracts. 
Instead of inducing employers to offer more good jobs, the federal gov- 
ernment might consider compelling them to do it. In a system of compul- 
sion through employment quotas it would be difficult and dangerous to 
formulate precise but complicated definitions of who the disadvantaged 
workers were and what kind of job should be opened up for them. For 
example, it is appropriate to reward an employer for keeping a worker on 
the job for more than two years but it would be catastrophic  to require him 
to keep all of his workers that long. The theory of statistical discrimination 
suggests a simple answer to the problem of formulating quotas: If easily 
observed characteristics are highly correlated with inability to find good 
jobs, the quotas should be stated in terms of these characteristics.  In prac- 
tical terms this means setting employment quotas for women and for racial 
minorities. A  fairly detailed proposal for a policy of this kind has been 
made by John Kenneth Galbraith, Edwin Kuh, and Lester C. Thurow.33 
They propose that all employers with more than 2,000 employees be re- 
quired, within ten to thirteen years (depending on firm size), to  employ 
women,  blacks,  and  Spanish-speaking workers in  proportion  to  their 
presence in the labor force. Further, in order to guard against balancing 
black janitors and female typists, for example, against white male execu- 
tives, they would require that the appropriate ratios prevail in each wage 
33. "The  Galbraith  Plan  To Promote  the Minorities,"  The  New York  Times  Magazine 
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class as well as overall. Thus about one-third of all jobs paying more than 
five dollars per hour would have to be held by women, and one-eighth of 
them by blacks. Undoubtedly, this policy would have a substantial impact 
on the Phillips curve: If the unemployment rates of women and of blacks 
could be reduced to the level of white males, the overall rate would drop 
by between 1.0 and 1.5 percentage points. This policy far transcends the 
scope  of  manpower policy  and seems remote from political feasibility. 
What, then, might realistically  be done to shift the Phillips curve?  Among 
the manpower programs discussed in this paper, none seems capable of 
bringing about a substantial reduction in the amount of unemployment 
observed at a given rate of inflation. Programs for streamlining the opera- 
tion of the labor market might induce a small shift in the Phillips curve of 
perhaps 0.2  percentage point  in  the  unemployment rate. An  expanded 
federal policy directed particularly  at teenagers might bring about another 
shift of about the same magnitude. Beyond this, programs for training or 
for subsidized employment do not seem capable of inducing a perceptible 
shift in the Phillips curve. 
This paper and that by Holt and associates that  follows  were dis- 
cussed together. The discussion  begins on page 723 below. 